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 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal theory wrestles perennially with a variety of seemingly 
intractable problems. I include among them questions about what we are 
doing when we interpret legal texts, the distinctions between hard and easy 
cases and between rules and standards, and the meaning of the rule of law.  
It is quite possible that the apparent intractability of these problems 
reflects nothing more than that they involve the use of “essentially 
contested concepts.”1 However, I argue in this Article that we can, in fact, 
make substantial progress toward clarifying these problems and making 
them much more intelligible. We can do this by keeping in mind the role 
that social values play in law. And that role is fundamental: social values 
constitute the law. 
By “social values” I mean those things that are widely thought to be 
important in a community.
2
 Law shapes a community by mediating private 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Temple University. Special thanks to Alice Abreu, my co-author on a 
series of articles, which is part of a project designed to reconceive federal tax jurisprudence. Alice G. 
Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295 (2011) [hereinafter Defining 
Income]; Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule: A Better Way to Understand the 
Definition of Income, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 101 (2012); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Standards: Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 53 
(2015). This Article, which elaborates upon and generalizes the jurisprudential framework we use in 
those articles, benefitted greatly from Alice’s close and critical reading of earlier drafts. Moreover, 
many of the ideas developed herein emerged from and thus owe an enormous debt to our 
collaboration. Thanks also to Temple University Beasley School of Law for its financial support. 
 1. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, NEW 
SERIES, 167, 167–98 (1956). 
 2. For a discussion of the meaning of “community” in this Article, see infra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
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disputes, facilitating private transactions, regulating public behavior, and 
authorizing the exercise of coercive power by the government, as well as 
by identifying limits on that power. Therefore, the fundamental question 
for law is what kind of community its members want to live in. That 
question is a question of social values: it is a question that requires them to 
decide what they care about as a community. Social values can, 
accordingly, reflect moral values widely held within the community or 
instrumental public policies widely thought to be critical to the 
community’s well-being. But social values are not to be strictly identified 
with morality or public policy or any other particular category of concerns. 
A community’s social values just are those things that the community, in 
fact, cares about.  
Of course, to understate the matter, members of a community do not 
necessarily agree about social values. We care about many different 
things, and we also care about the same things to different degrees. These 
heterogeneous concerns are often in tension, and the resulting conflicts 
over social values are reflected in the community’s treatment of 
controversial legal issues (abortion and affirmative action come readily to 
mind). So if my assertion that social values are widely shared concerns of 
the community is correct, we need to understand what that means with 
respect to values lacking community consensus.  
Moreover, what a community cares about and how that is reflected in 
law will change over time. For example, the landscape of civil rights law 
looks very different in twenty-first-century America than it did at the end 
of the nineteenth century. Thus, we need to understand how the 
contingency of social values relates to the stability that we generally think 
important for law.  
I address both of these considerations in Part I, which sketches a 
jurisprudential framework for thinking about the relationship of social 
values to law. Then, in Part II, I aim to suggest the utility of that 
framework by showing how it casts new and revealing light on the 
important jurisprudential puzzles with which I began this Article puzzles 
about interpretation, hard and easy cases, rules and standards, and the rule 
of law. 
What follows is not the result of sociological investigation; I present no 
empirical data to support my argument that social values constitute law. 
Nor is it analytical; it is not a claim that the role of social values emerges 
from rigorous thinking about the concept of law. The argument in this 
Article should, rather, be regarded as a thought experiment. My thesis is 
that if we think about the relationship of social values to law in the way 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss1/1
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that I suggest, a variety of important jurisprudential issues become more 
comprehensible. 
I. THE FRAMEWORK 
To get some purchase on my claim that social values constitute the law, 
I want to start with the familiar idea of a “field of law” and argue that a 
field of law (torts, contracts, criminal law, corporate law, civil procedure, 
etc.) is defined by a discourse whose subject matter is the governance of a 
certain kind of human activity—that is, it is defined by conversations 
designed to identify what is required, permitted, and prohibited with 
respect to that activity. Put another way: fields of law emerge from 
community discourse about what human activities ought to be subject to 
governance and how they should be governed. 
By “governance” I mean that the requirements, permissions, and 
prohibitions that emerge from this community discourse are enforceable 
by coercive power. By “community” I mean those whose perceived 
mutual interest in governing one another’s activities leads to discourse on 
that subject.
3
 Through these descriptions I mean to suggest that law and 
communities are mutually constituting: to be a community means (perhaps 
among many other things) to be a collection of persons who perceive a 
mutual need to govern certain kinds of human activity, and the parameters 
of governance, as I noted, emerge from that discourse. 
What distinguishes law from, say, the rules of a sport or the bylaws of 
an organization is not the source of coercive power (e.g., the sovereign)
4
 
or the justification of coercion (e.g., rules of recognition,
5
 the basic norm,
6
 
natural law
7
). Law differs from other systems of coercive norms in its 
pervasiveness. That is, fields of law can potentially address any type of 
human activity within the community. Thus, Major League Baseball’s 
 
 
 3. While the field-defining discourses are routinely carried out by those who have official 
responsibilities for employing the community’s coercive power (executives, legislators, judges, 
administrators, law enforcement officials, etc.), participation by the general public—i.e., by anyone 
subject to the community’s coercive power—is commonplace. 
 4. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 191–200 (1832). Among 
the implications of rejecting Austin’s definition of law as the general commands of the sovereign is to 
blur, if not erase, his distinction between municipal law, which consists of laws “properly so called,” 
id. at 4, and international law, which Austin identified as a branch of “positive morality,” id. at 132. 
Thinking about law in terms of social values opens up the possibility of properly regarding 
international law as law. 
 5. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97–107 (1961). 
 6. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 115–22 (A. Wedberg trans. 
1945). 
 7. See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II.95.2 (Anton C. Pegis ed., 1948). 
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governance of professional baseball players is limited to the professional 
baseball-related activities of those players, team owners, umpires, etc., 
associated with the sport;
8
 the American Medical Association’s 
governance of its members is limited to the activities of those members 
associated with the aims of the organization, including the practice of 
medicine. The “law” of Pennsylvania, on the other hand, can regulate 
potentially any activity of members of the Pennsylvania community 
(including baseball and the practice of medicine), and any substantive 
limits on legal governance
9
 are either self-imposed,
10
 or imposed by the 
law of a superior governing community.
11
 Again, law differs from other 
systems of governance within a community in its pervasiveness, and a 
field of law, like contracts, torts, criminal law, and so forth, picks out one 
particular category of human activity among the panoply of human 
activities that are subject to governance by law. 
The discourses that define various fields of law are constituted by 
social values. A field of law will govern a particular category of human 
activity because the community believes regulation of that activity to be 
important, and the scope and details of that regulation will emerge from 
conversations within the community about why and in what way it is 
important to regulate the activity. These issues of what is important—what 
the community cares about—are what I mean by “social values.” The 
social values that traditionally constitute the field of criminal law, for 
example, include, among others, retribution and various utilitarian values 
such as deterrence.
12
 This definition of values is intentionally broad. What 
we care about includes goals, interests, policies, principles, and so forth; 
 
 
 8.  Even when MLB regulates players’ conduct that does not seem directly related to baseball 
(e.g., marijuana use, domestic abuse), the justification focuses on the impact of such activity on the 
integrity and well-being of the professional sport. 
 9. E.g., exclusion of the regulation of religion. 
 10. E.g., through ratification of state and federal constitutions. 
 11. E.g., state law limits on local law. 
 12. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 26–36 (5th ed. 2010). To be more precise, the 
things that the community cares about when reflecting on “why and in what way it is important to 
regulate the activity” covered by a particular field of law operate on different levels. This first level is 
the “why?” and when we reflect on the “why?” we must first focus on the overall point of the field. In 
the case of criminal law its point is to structure punishment for certain behavior. Asking the “why?” 
question—Why do we punish?—generates the traditional list of retributive and utilitarian values noted 
in the text. By then reflecting on those first-level values, we can identify a second level of values: 
values that address the question “in what way?” In the case of criminal law, reflection on the first-level 
values yields second-level values, like proportionality and fair warning, which reveal what we care 
about when we are deciding whom to punish and how. For simplicity the references to values in this 
article are generally to first-level values. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss1/1
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moreover, what we care about can touch on economic, moral, political, 
aesthetic, religious, and other concerns.  
Accordingly, fields of law will differ because the particular 
constellation of social values that constitutes one field-defining discourse 
will differ from the particular constellations that constitute other field-
defining discourses. That is, the difference between torts and contracts is 
not, in the first instance, that one field governs some activity called torts 
and the other some activity called contracts. Rather, we conceptualize torts 
and contracts differently because different social values generate different 
principles for governing those activities. Thus, a field of law exists if and 
only if the community discourse defining it is constituted by a unique set 
of things the community cares about. For this reason, I will often refer to 
the field itself as being constituted by a unique set of social values.
13
  
While each field is constituted by a unique set of values, different 
fields of law can share certain values. For example, individual autonomy is 
a fundamental concern in the fields of both tort and contract law, and 
community safety is a fundamental concern in the fields of both criminal 
procedure and food-and-drug regulation. Moreover, transcendent “law 
values” identify concerns that are important (albeit to varying degrees) in 
all fields of law. These include justice (achieving the overall “best” answer 
to a legal question within a field), administrability (the efficient and 
effective functioning of each field), libertarian values (concerned with 
reducing the law’s interference with individual autonomy), and the rule of 
law (with its core concerns of equal protection, certainty, and placing 
identifiable constraints on the power of officials).
14
 
Here again we need to employ the idea of “mutually constituting.” 
Fields of law are constituted by discourses about specific social values, but 
just what the values constituting a particular field are and what they mean 
(including how they apply), emerge from the discourse. That is, a 
community’s collective and ongoing conversations about important 
questions that arise within the field will tend to converge on widely shared 
understandings of the identity and meaning of the relevant social values. 
Thus, the values that traditionally constitute criminal law are not the 
product of legislative enactment. Their importance has emerged from the 
 
 
 13. From this point on all references to “values” will mean “social values,” unless the context 
indicates otherwise. 
 14. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–80 
(1989). These three do not necessarily exhaust the universe of such “law values.” For example, law-
and-economics theorists would add wealth maximization to the list. See generally RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011). 
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use of criminal law and debate over issues raised by criminal law over the 
course of centuries. Because society changes, there is no reason to believe 
that the identity or meaning of these social values is fixed. Hence, whether 
retribution is very important or important at all to criminal law and policy 
(as well as what retribution means) is a contingent fact, which, again, 
emerges from our conversations about it, and those conversations 
potentially change over time. 
The widely shared social values that constitute fields of law are not 
only contingent, they are also multiple. In a complex and diverse society 
we care about different things, and the social values that define a field 
will, therefore, be multiple. For instance, tort law is shaped by a collection 
of values that include imposition of liability on individuals who cause 
harm, imposition of liability on individuals whose conduct is 
blameworthy, and compensation of innocent victims.
15
 To take another 
example, criminal law, as observed above, is defined by values that 
include retribution and various utilitarian values such as deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.  
A quick examination of these two examples shows further that the 
social values that define a legal field are heterogeneous. Compensation, 
fault, and harm causation cannot be reduced to one another, nor can they 
be subsumed under a single, broader rubric; that is, they are different 
things that we care about when we converse about tort law. The same is 
true of the values that constitute criminal law. Being heterogeneous, these 
multiple social values are potentially in tension and can even conflict.  
The community’s field-constituting social values are, as mentioned 
earlier, contingent and thus subject to change. At the same time, these 
values are not normally volatile; that is, the identity and the meaning of 
the social values that constitute a field of law will not vary wildly from 
moment to moment. But why is that so? Given the contingency, 
multiplicity, and heterogeneity of social values in a diverse society, why 
do the community’s conversations tend to converge on widely shared and 
largely stable understandings of the identity and meaning of the social 
values that constitute fields of law? There are at least two reasons. 
One explanation begins with the functions of law, which include, as 
mentioned above, facilitating private transactions, mediating private 
disputes, regulating public behavior, and structuring and limiting coercion 
by public officials. These functions require predictability, which in turn 
requires stability in the meaning and application of legal provisions. To 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
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make this point in reverse: as a community, we will tend to converge on 
stable, shared understandings of the social values constitutive of legal 
fields because it is important to us to have law—to have social practices 
that facilitate private transactions, mediate private disputes, regulate public 
behavior, and that structure and limit coercion by public officials.  
I can illustrate this point by considering the interpretation of traffic 
signs. These legal texts are, in principle, subject to any number of 
interpretations—especially since so much of their meaning is not literally 
provided in the signs themselves. For example, the typical speed limit sign 
does not explicitly indicate whether it establishes an upper or lower limit. 
But we all know what the various traffic signs mean. We have to. The 
function of the signs is to provide safe regulation of traffic by enabling 
each driver to accurately anticipate what other drivers will do. In addition, 
each driver has an interest in avoiding punishment. None of this would be 
possible if we (including both drivers and law enforcement officials) did 
not all easily understand the meaning of traffic signs in the same way. So 
our individual interpretations of traffic signs converge on shared 
meanings, which enable the signs to serve their function and our 
interests.
16
  
A second explanation for the community’s convergence on widely 
shared and stable understandings of a field’s values is expressive. If a legal 
field is constituted by social values—the things we care about—then 
identifying those values and their meanings through its law is a way in 
which the community publicly announces what it stands for. Just as an 
individual defines what she stands for through actions that express her 
values, so a community defines itself through the way in which it 
facilitates private transactions, mediates private disputes, regulates public 
behavior, and structures and limits coercion by public officials. And just as 
an individual’s integrity depends on the consistency with which she 
expresses her values through action, so the integrity of a community 
depends on the consistency of its laws and their enforcement. The 
possibility of such a consistency depends on stable, widely shared 
understandings of the social values that constitute fields of law. To be 
more precise: the identity of a community—what distinguishes countries, 
states, localities, etc. from one another—is bound up with what it stands 
for. Differences among the things that different communities care about 
distinguish them from one another. The tort law of Arizona differs from 
that of New Hampshire because of differences in what Arizona and New 
 
 
 16. This convergence is facilitated by education, experience, and so forth. 
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Hampshire stand for as communities, which is to say, because of 
differences in social values. Thus, the convergence on widely shared and 
stable understandings of a field of law is driven not just by a community’s 
desire for legal integrity, but by its desire to express consistently through 
action—including legal action—what the community stands for at the 
deepest levels of values.
17
 
These two explanations for the community’s convergence on widely 
shared and stable understandings of a field’s values reflect that the account 
of law offered in this article is rooted in pragmatism and existentialism. Its 
pragmatist dimension lies in the notion that the content of law emerges 
from public activity: the community grapples with day-to-day social 
problems that raise questions about the governance of human activity by 
engaging with important questions within fields of law and by using 
provisions of law to address these problems.
18
 Its existential dimension 
lies in the notion that this law-creating public activity is one especially 
important way that the community gives definition, value, and meaning to 
its existence. 
A corollary to the claim that a field of law is constituted by a unique set 
of contingent, multiple, and heterogeneous social values—the particular 
things the community cares about when engaging with important questions 
that arise within the field—is this further claim: in order to function 
successfully within a given field of law, a specific provision of law (a 
definition, a rule, a standard, a doctrine, etc.) must promote one or more of 
the social values from among the universe of those that define the field. 
Accordingly, I define a provision’s “aptness” as its tendency to further one 
or more of these relevant values.
19
  
 
 
 17. For a thorough discussion of expressive theory and its application to law, see Elizabeth S. 
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1503 (2000). 
 18. It is important to note that from the pragmatist perspective that there is no available test for 
objectivity that is independent of the community’s judgment about how best to understand and make 
effective use of the thing in question—in this case, law. That means that the community’s judgment 
about such issues as what values constitute a field of law cannot be submitted to some independent test 
that could demonstrate that this judgment is “objectively” wrong. This lack of an independent test for 
objective truth extends to the question whether a particular provision of law is apt, which is defined in 
the next paragraph, and to questions of interpretation, which are discussed in Part II, infra. Of course, 
all community judgments are, from a pragmatist perspective, provisional, and one can make arguments 
that the community’s determination is incorrect. If in time the community comes to widely accept 
those arguments and thus changes its mind, then its new determination will be taken to be objectively 
correct and the old determination objectively wrong. (Courts often reflect this when overruling earlier 
decisions. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers [v. Hardwick] was not 
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”)) 
 19. The idea of aptness was first developed in Defining Income, supra note , at 325–33. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss1/1
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Just as social values emerge from the discourse that defines a particular 
field, so it is that the aptness of a provision emerges from that discourse. 
That is, whether a particular provision promotes one or more of the things 
the community cares about when engaging with important questions 
within the field is determined by the community through that engagement. 
Put another way, aptness is not an inherent feature of a provision. Like 
values, aptness is contingent on its relationship to an ongoing and 
changing social discourse; hence, a provision that is taken to be apt at one 
point in time might be taken to be inapt at another point in time, and vice 
versa. 
Aptness is closely aligned with the idea of legitimacy in the subjective 
or descriptive sense (what Max Weber called “Legitimitätsglaube”).20 
Legitimacy in this sense refers to the community’s belief that an action by 
a government official is proper and justified.
21
 A provision is apt just 
insofar as it reflects one or more of the social values that define the 
provision’s field. And since those values are what the community cares 
about, an apt provision will align with the community’s social values and 
be perceived as legitimate. Of course, since the values that define the field 
are multiple and heterogeneous, an apt provision might reflect some values 
but conflict with others. Since individual members of the community may 
well prioritize those values differently, an apt provision will not 
necessarily be perceived as the best instantiation of the law by everyone.
22
 
Nonetheless, to the extent that even those who disagree with the provision 
recognize that the provision reflects at least some widely held social 
values within the community, the legitimacy of the provision (if not its 
universal popularity) can be acknowledged. 
I will argue in Part II that an apt provision, when applied, tends to 
generate predominantly noncontroversial cases. But I note here that a 
provision that lacks aptness is unstable because it is inapt. Consider the 
example of the Jacksonville, Florida vagrancy ordinance struck down by 
the Supreme Court of the United States as unconstitutionally vague in its 
1972 decision, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.
23
 According to the 
 
 
 20. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 382 (Talcott Parsons 
ed., Free Press 1964). 
 21. See generally Fabienne Peter, Political Legitimacy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., spring 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/ 
legitimacy/ (last visited July 1, 2014). 
 22. This is why widespread agreement does not require unanimity and why judges deciding cases 
can rationally disagree about the outcome of the case (in dissenting opinions) and the rationale for the 
decision (in concurring opinions). 
 23. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
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Court, the language of the ordinance failed “to give notice of conduct to be 
avoided”24 and thereby placed “unfettered discretion . . . in the hands of 
the . . . police,”25 transforming all sorts of ordinary conduct into potential 
violations of the law, depending on whether the police wished to respect 
the autonomy of the individual or saw the individual as a threat to the 
social order. And the reason for this defect is identified in a single 
paragraph early in the Court’s opinion, where it notes that the statute was 
“derived from early English law” designed to address “labor shortages” 
caused by the “breakup of feudal estates,” and subsequently “became 
criminal aspects of the poor laws.”26 Thus, the language might have been 
apt in the historical context of its origin, but those specific goals and 
values no longer applied in late twentieth-century Florida. And the 
consequence was an altogether inapt provision, whose meaning lacked 
stability and hence could be used as an instrument of official coercion with 
few limitations. 
In addition to its aptness, a provision of law can be characterized by its 
degree of “openness” to reflecting the multiple social values that constitute 
the field and to absorbing changes in the inventory and meaning of those 
values. Again, an apt provision will reflect one or more of the social 
values that constitute the field, but one that reflects multiple values equally 
is different from one that privileges one or a few of those values while 
subordinating the rest. The concept of openness is designed to capture this 
difference. A provision reflecting many of the social values that define the 
field of law to which it belongs displays a high degree of openness; one 
privileging one or a few displays a low degree of openness.  
Consider two examples from tort law. As noted above, tort law is 
shaped by a set of social values that includes compensation, fault, and 
harm causation. The duty of ordinary care, central to the sub-field of 
negligence law, serves those three values in roughly equal measure.
27
 
Thus, the doctrine is apt (in that it promotes relevant tort values) and it 
displays a high degree of openness (in that it promotes multiple tort 
values). By contrast, the doctrine of negligence per se demotes the value 
of fault. It does this by presuming fault, whether it in fact exists or not, in 
certain easily identifiable contexts (e.g., violation of a statute). Since 
negligence per se continues to vigorously promote compensation and harm 
 
 
 24. Id. at 166. 
 25. Id. at 168. 
 26. Id. at 161. 
 27. For further discussion of this point in the context of rules and standards see infra note 58 and 
accompanying text. 
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2015] TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF SOCIAL VALUES 11 
 
 
 
 
causation, it is apt, and since the set of promoted values has narrowed, the 
doctrine’s degree of openness is lower than that displayed by the duty of 
ordinary care. 
Functionally, values point toward certain facts as relevant when 
applying a provision. That is, since social values express what the 
community cares about—what is important to it—a fact becomes relevant 
in legal analysis when some value shows it to be important to the analysis. 
Accordingly, a very open provision—one that reflects many values—will 
tend to make many facts relevant when the provision is applied; 
conversely, a provision with a low degree of openness—one that reflects 
only one or a few values or that privileges a particular value over others—
will tend to make only a small number of facts relevant. For example, 
application of the tort standard of ordinary care, with its high degree of 
openness, normally requires a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to 
determining whether the duty has been breached; by contrast, application 
of the negligence per se doctrine focuses more narrowly on whether the 
conduct in question constitutes, say, violation of a statute. 
A provision’s degree of openness, like the identity and meaning of 
field-constituting social values and like aptness, will emerge from the 
community’s discourse about the provision in the course of using that 
provision to serve the functions of law—i.e., to govern human activity 
within the field. In practical terms, that discourse will determine whether 
the provision is to be interpreted as a rule or a standard, and I will argue in 
Part II that the fact that the degree of a provision’s openness emerges over 
time challenges various features of the conventional understanding of rules 
and standards. 
II. FOUR PUZZLES 
A. Interpretation 
Questions pertaining to the interpretation of legal texts—statutes, 
judicial opinions, administrative regulations, constitutional provisions, and 
so forth—have generated no end of commentary. Whether a statute should 
be interpreted in accordance with the text’s plain meaning or its legislative 
purpose, whether a constitution is to be interpreted according to the intent 
of its Framers or is to be treated as an organic document whose meaning 
evolves along with the polity it constitutes—issues like these have long 
preoccupied lawyers, judges, and scholars.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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But just what is the interpretation of legal texts about? This meta-
question has received far less attention,
28
 yet it seems important. For 
unless we understand just what we are doing when we determine the 
meaning of statutes, opinions, regulations, and constitutions, it is hard to 
get a handle on what exactly is at stake with respect to how we do it.  
In this part, I argue that social values are implicated in every act of 
legal interpretation and that when we keep that in mind, the meaning of 
interpretation becomes perspicuous. I will advance this argument in three 
steps. First, in Part II.A.1, I will offer an account of legal interpretation 
and then employ it in Part II.A.2 to examine what it means to say that a 
particular proposition of law is “true” or “correct.” In Part II.A.3, I will 
sharpen the idea of interpretation by contrasting it with two other activities 
involving the meaning of a legal proposition: exercises of enforcement 
discretion and disregard of the law.  
1. What is Interpretation? 
Interpretation is the activity whereby the interpreter gives meaning to 
the provision. Interpretations can be correct or incorrect. If an 
interpretation of a legal provision can be said to be “correct,” then that 
interpretation must be apt, in the sense developed in Part I, since a correct 
interpretation of a provision that does not reflect one or more of the social 
values that constitute the field in which the provision is located would be 
oxymoronic. Again, the aptness of a provision is not an intrinsic feature, 
but a provisional characteristic that emerges from the field-defining 
discourse within the community that engages with serious questions within 
the field. Accordingly, the aptness of an interpretation of a provision is 
contingently determined by that discourse. 
But because, as noted in Part I, the social values that constitute the field 
are multiple and heterogeneous—and thus in tension and potential 
conflict—multiple, competing interpretations can be anchored in one or 
more of the relevant values. That is, multiple, competing interpretations 
can be apt. Consequently, there must be some criterion beyond aptness 
that distinguishes an interpretation that is correct from one that is 
incorrect. 
If we consider the well-known phenomenon of arguments rooted in 
doctrinal values being made in dissenting opinions, only to become the 
 
 
 28. Probably the most famous examination of the nature of legal interpretation is Ronald 
Dworkin’s. See Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179 (1982); see 
generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
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core of the majority’s ruling some years later, we could take the position 
that one of the arguments in each such situation is at all times correct.
29
 
Just such a claim was made by the Supreme Court in its 2003 ruling in 
Lawrence v. Texas, when, in overruling the 1996 decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, the Court said, “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, 
and it is not correct today.”30  
I suggest instead that just as the social values constituting a field and 
the aptness of particular interpretations of provisions emerge from the 
field-defining discourse, so, too, does the perception of a particular 
interpretation as “correct.” That is, an interpretation that receives 
widespread approbation as the best interpretation within the community of 
those who grapple with important questions in the relevant field of law 
will be perceived as a correct interpretation. If at some future time a 
different interpretation supplants the earlier in achieving widespread 
approval as the best, the earlier interpretation will have become incorrect. 
If, as I argue here, there is no test for the correctness of an interpretation 
beyond its reception in the community, then a correct interpretation of a 
legal text is one that is both apt and is widely regarded as best within the 
community. 
The difference, then, between a correct and an incorrect interpretation 
of a legal provision is that the latter is apt, but not widely accepted within 
the community as the best interpretation of that provision. On the other 
hand, a reading of a provision that is not apt—i.e., that cannot be justified 
in terms of the field’s values—is not recognizable as an interpretation at 
all within the field. 
One interesting feature of this definition of a correct interpretation is its 
resonance with the idea of legitimacy. As noted above, any apt provision 
may be acknowledged as legitimate, even by those who disagree with it, 
insofar as it reflects widely held community values. But the legitimacy of 
a correct interpretation of the provision is even more secure: not only does 
it reflect values that are widely accepted within the community, but its 
status as the widely accepted best interpretation further insures that its 
legitimacy will be generally acknowledged. 
A further implication of the above definition of a correct interpretation 
is that a final and authoritative interpretation does not conclude the issue 
of correctness. An interpretation of a provision that does not receive 
widespread approval as best is, for that reason, not correct—even when 
 
 
 29. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (adopting the analysis of Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Bowers). 
 30. Id. 
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made by a court of last resort. Striking examples are Supreme Court 
interpretations of the Constitution that are quickly overruled by 
constitutional amendment.
31
 Conversely, a dissenting opinion that 
resonates strongly within the community may be a correct interpretation—
i.e., one that is both apt and widely accepted.  
More commonly, an authoritative ruling that initially achieves 
widespread acceptance as a correct ruling might over time come to be 
widely seen to be incorrect as social values change, and a new decision 
will overrule the former. A famous example is the Court’s 1896 ruling in 
Plessy v. Ferguson
32
 that “separate but equal” public accommodations 
satisfy the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
33
 In such 
a case it can be fairly said that different and inconsistent interpretations of 
a particular legal text may at different points in time all be correct 
interpretations of the text. 
This way of distinguishing between correct and incorrect 
interpretations has implications for perennial debates over statutory and 
constitutional interpretation. Different interpretations of a statutory text—
reflecting, say, textualist, purposivist, plain meaning, and intentionalist 
approaches—might be justifiable in terms of the substantive field to which 
the statutory text in question belongs (contract law, for example). In 
addition, each of these various approaches can be justified in terms of 
social values defining the field of statutory interpretation. That is, each 
approach can be justified in terms of the things we care about when 
engaging in the practice of interpreting statutes. These intersecting lines of 
justification in terms of relevant values can produce a variety of apt 
interpretations.
34
 Again, however, which of these apt interpretations is 
 
 
 31. E.g., Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) (overruled in 1794 by the Eleventh 
Amendment); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (overruled in 1971 by the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment). Probably the most dramatic example is the 1857 ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. 393 (1857), holding, inter alia, that a slave brought into a state in which slavery was banned was, 
nonetheless, a slave and, therefore, not a citizen. The decision was overruled by the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, ratified in 1865 and 1868, respectively. The controversy triggered by the 
Dred Scott decision was immediate and of such intensity that it is credited with contributing to both 
the economic Panic of 1857, see Charles Calomiris and Larry Schweikart, The Panic of 1857: Origins, 
Transmission, Containment, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 807, 816 (1991), and the Civil War, see, e.g., Gregory 
J. Wallance, Dred Scott Decision: The Lawsuit That Started the Civil War, HISTORYNET.COM, 
http://www.historynet.com/dred-scott (last visited Dec. 31, 2013). 
 32. 163 U.S. 537 (1886). 
 33. The reasoning of the case was effectively renounced by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 34. Consider, for example, the various opinions in McBoyle v. United States, 43 F.2d 273 (10th 
Cir. 1930) and McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931), in which consideration of various values 
pertaining to the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act and to the interpretation of federal statutes generate 
three different but apt interpretations of the relevant law. 
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correct depends on its reception. Just as the community’s discourse about 
fields of law will converge on stable, shared understandings of the 
constitutive social values of those fields, so the community’s discourse 
will normally converge provisionally on one of a number of competing 
interpretations as the correct one.  
Similarly, applications of a constitutional provision can generate 
competing results depending on whether the provision is interpreted 
through, say, a textualist, originalist, or evolutionary lens. Inasmuch as 
these three lenses reflect social values concerning what we care about 
when we interpret the Constitution, each can generate an apt interpretation 
(as long as the interpretation also reflects one or more social values 
concerning the substance of the provision in question). And once again, 
which of these apt interpretations is correct depends on which is widely 
accepted as the best interpretation. Because our social values concerning 
the meaning of the Constitution reflect some of the community’s most 
fundamental and defining concerns, disagreements about what 
interpretation of a provision is correct often persist, even long after the 
Supreme Court has authoritatively answered the question. In extreme 
cases, the community’s discourse will fail to converge on one of a number 
of competing interpretations as the correct one. When that happens (as, for 
example, it has regarding the proper application of the fourteenth 
amendment’s Due Process Clause to the issue of abortion), then there is 
for the time being no correct interpretation. 
2. The Truth Value of Legal Propositions 
A proposition of law is a claim about what the law is. What makes a 
proposition of law true? Western jurisprudence in the nineteenth and first 
half of the twentieth century offered a spectrum of answers to this 
question. At one end of the spectrum is the answer posited by legal 
science: a proposition of law is true if it is the result of the correct 
application of proper method to the relevant data. For the continental 
European version, the relevant data were found in the Code: rationally 
constructed legislation created by democratically elected legislators.
35
 In 
the American version, Christopher Columbus Langdell argued that the 
relevant data were the appellate decisions of judges.
36
 In either of these 
 
 
 35. See JOHN HENRY MARRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA, ch. 5 (3d ed. 2007). 
 36. See CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS, Preface (1871). 
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variations, any legal question could, in principle, be answered by the more 
or less mechanical application of legal materials by a skilled jurist. 
At the other end of the spectrum the American Legal Realists insisted 
that the content of law was determined by its use. Thus, a nineteenth-
century precursor of Realism, John Chipman Gray, argued that the 
fundamental data of the legal scientists—the Code, appellate cases—were 
not law, but were “sources” of law.37 The actual content of the law was not 
determined until a judge interpreted and applied these sources to answer 
actual legal questions.
38
 Thus, the truth of a legal proposition must await 
its determination by a court. Gray’s contemporary, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., went one step further, holding that law was the prediction of 
how courts would resolve cases in the future.
39
 Accordingly, a proposition 
of law was true under Holmes’s conception if and only if the proposition 
proved to accurately anticipate the behavior of judges in deciding cases. 
This behavior-based understanding of law was foundational for the 
development of Realism.
40
 
I want to offer a dynamic approach to determining the truth of legal 
propositions. Legal texts—the objects of interpretation, which yields 
propositions of law—have no intrinsic meaning. Rather, their meaning is 
determined by their use to resolve legal issues. So far, this sounds very 
much like Realism. However, my focus in not on the behavior of officials, 
like judges, but on the community as a whole. This reveals both a 
normative dimension (a concern for which propositions of law are 
consistent with the values accepted by the community as defining the 
relevant field) and a sociological dimension (a concern for which 
propositions of law are actually accepted by the community as correct). 
To explain this approach, I want to begin by defining two types of 
propositions of law, which I will unimaginatively call Abstract 
Propositions and Concrete Propositions. An Abstract Proposition is a 
claim about the abstract meaning of some legal provision; a Concrete 
Proposition is a claim about the application of an Abstract Proposition to a 
particular set of facts. Examples of both these types of legal propositions 
 
 
 37. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 118–20 (1909). 
 38. See id. at 115–16. 
 39. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1896–1897). 
 40. Holmes’ future-oriented conceptualization suggests a different—temporal—way of slicing up 
ways of understanding what makes a proposition of law true. Some theories of law (e.g., legal 
positivism and legal science) look to the past (e.g., the commands of the sovereign, appellate court 
decisions) to determine the content of law, and thus the truth value of propositions of law. Some (e.g., 
natural law) look to the present (e.g., timeless principle of natural morality). Some (e.g., American 
Legal Realism) look to the future (e.g., the behavior of judges). 
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can be found in the majority opinions of many appellate court decisions. 
For instance, in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. the Supreme Court 
of the United States addressed the issue “whether money received as 
exemplary damages for fraud or as the punitive two-thirds portion of a 
treble-damage antitrust recovery must be reported by a taxpayer as gross 
income under § 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.”41 In the 
course of its opinion, the Court asserted the Abstract Proposition that the 
term “gross income” includes all “instances of undeniable accessions to 
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion.”42 The Court applied this proposition to the specific instance of 
a treble-damage judgment received by a successful antitrust plaintiff and 
concluded not only that the actual compensatory damages are income (a 
conclusion not disputed by the plaintiff-taxpayer), but that the entire 
treble-damage award is gross income.
43
 These conclusions are Concrete 
Propositions. 
In Part II.A.1, above, I offered an account of what it means for an 
interpretation to be correct. We can now see that an Abstract Proposition is 
true if the interpretation of the provision reflected in the claim is correct, 
and a Concrete Proposition is true if both the interpretation of the 
provision reflected in the claim is correct and the application of the 
provision to the statement of facts included in the proposition is logically 
sound.
44
 
Both the Abstract and Concrete Propositions in the Court’s Glenshaw 
Glass opinion invoked § 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 
(“‘Gross income’ includes gains, profits, and income derived from 
salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service . . . of whatever kind 
and in whatever form paid.”).45 If the Court’s interpretation of this 
provision of the Internal Revenue Code is correct, then the conditions 
required for the truth of the Abstract Proposition quoted above are 
satisfied. In the case of the Glenshaw Glass Court’s Concrete Propositions 
(the application of the Court’s interpretation of the Code to the specific 
 
 
 41. 348 U.S. 426, 427 (1955). 
 42. Id. at 431. 
 43. Id. 
 44. The truth of a Concrete Proposition does not depend on the truth of the statement of facts to 
which a legal provision is applied. A law professor’s application of a true Abstract Proposition to a 
hypothetical (often fictional) set of facts can generate a true Concrete Proposition if the application is 
logically correct. Similarly, an appeals court can correctly apply a true Abstract Proposition to a set of 
facts that were incorrectly found to be true by the trial court, thereby producing a true Concrete 
Proposition. 
 45. Id. at 429. 
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factual setting), the truth of those propositions depends additionally on 
whether the application of the interpretation of the Code to those facts is 
consistent with the demands of logic.  
3. Interpretation, Disregard, and Prosecutorial Discretion 
To anticipate the distinctions I wish to make in this part, here is a story. 
On June 10, 2014, I was driving south through New England on a stretch 
of route I-95 with a posted speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour. My 
cruise control was set to seventy miles per hour. At one point I drove right 
past a stationary police vehicle. Inside the vehicle a police officer was 
unmistakably aiming a radar gun at passing cars, including mine. I 
continued to drive at seventy miles per hour, five miles per hour above the 
literal posted speed limit. The police vehicle remained stationary, and I 
received no ticket for speeding. 
There are three was of understanding what happened, each of which 
“fits the facts.” The first understanding is that the police officer 
disregarded the law. That is, I was driving in excess of the legal limit, and 
the officer failed to act appropriately and issue a ticket. The second 
understanding is that the officer exercised permissible enforcement 
discretion. That is, I was driving in excess of the legal limit, but the officer 
has discretion to overlook minor violations of the law under certain 
circumstances in order to best deploy limited law-enforcement resources. 
The third understanding is that the officer acted in accordance with the 
correct meaning of the law. That is, the speed limit, properly interpreted, 
permits some leeway (at least five miles per hour) above the literal limit.
46
 
As I said, each of these understandings of the officer’s conduct fits the 
facts. But which is correct? This part offers a way of thinking about these 
distinctions that, again, turns on a consideration of social values. 
We might approach that question by turning to a different question of 
interpretation: What is the correct meaning of the posted speed limit: 
“SPEED LIMIT 65”? If the correct meaning is restricted to a literal 
interpretation of the text, then the set of possible characterizations of the 
officer’s conduct is not narrowed. It could still be a disregard of the law or 
an exercise of enforcement discretion. It could even be characterized as 
 
 
 46. To be clear: The question raised in this paragraph is not about what the police officer thought 
she was doing. Rather, the question is how best to interpret what she did. Hence, the officer might 
have thought that she was exercising permissible enforcement discretion, but we can still conclude that 
the best understanding of her conduct is that she was really disregarding the law—or that her conduct 
was consistent with the actual meaning of the law. 
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interpretation, albeit an incorrect interpretation. On the other hand, if the 
correct meaning of the posted speed limit includes a permissible leeway 
for lawful driving above the literal posted speed, then the sensible 
characterization is that the officer did not ticket me because the officer 
concluded that my driving seventy miles per hour did not violate the law. 
But a question logically prior to whether an interpretation of the speed 
limit that includes a leeway is correct is whether the officer has the 
authority to interpret the law at all. In an important sense, of course, the 
officer cannot avoid interpretation. Every time the officer decides whether 
the facts justify chasing down a motorist and issuing a ticket for speeding, 
that decision depends on an interpretation of what the speed limit means. 
However, those tasked with enforcing laws can operate under severe 
constraints regarding what they may permissibly do in interpreting those 
laws. 
Consider, for example, the Clerk of the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery 
County, Pennsylvania, who issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
based on his interpretation of the law as rendering unconstitutional a 
provision of Pennsylvania’s “Marriage Laws,” which at the time declared 
it “to be the longstanding public policy of [Pennsylvania] that marriage 
shall be between one man and one woman”.47 The Commonwealth Court 
of Pennsylvania ruled that the Clerk “performs only ministerial duties”;48 
that as a consequence he has no authority “to exercise any discretion with 
respect to [the Marriage Law’s] provisions”;49 and that “[u]ntil a court has 
decided that an act is unconstitutional, [the Clerk] must enforce the law as 
written.”50 
More generally, it is a legal question whether an official has 
interpretive authority and, if so, what the extent of that authority is. As 
such, the correct answer to that question must, first of all, be apt; that is, 
the answer must reflect one or more of the values the community widely 
accepts as relevant to determining questions of interpretive authority. 
Second, the correct answer must be widely accepted within the community 
as the best answer to the question.  
Similarly, if instead of asking whether the official has interpretive 
authority, we ask whether the official has the discretion to suspend 
 
 
 47. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (1983). This provision was ruled unconstitutional in Whitewood 
v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014). The ruling was not appealed. See Pennsylvania 
governor: I won’t appeal court’s gay marriage ruling, THE GUARDIAN (May 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/21/pennsylvania-governor-no-appeal-gay-marriage-ruling. 
 48. Commonwealth v. Haynes, 78 A.2d 676, 683 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013). 
 49. Id. at 689. 
 50. Id. at 690. 
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enforcement of the law under certain circumstances, the correct answer to 
that question involves the same two inquiries. First, is the answer apt? 
Determining aptness in this context requires consideration of the values 
widely accepted by the community as relevant to justifying enforcement 
discretion.
51
 Second, is the answer widely accepted within the community 
as the best answer to the question? 
Accordingly, in the case of the police officer who did not ticket me, we 
interpret the officer’s action by asking whether the best answer to the 
question is that she interpreted the speed limit as permitting a certain 
leeway above the literal posted limit or that she exercised permissible 
discretion in not ticketing me for the violation of traveling five miles per 
hour above the posted limit or that she simply disregarded the law. The 
correct answer to this interpretive question must itself be apt, which 
requires us to identify the widely held values that inform our 
understanding of a police officer’s authority to interpret the law and 
discretion to suspend enforcement under certain circumstances. We might 
conclude that the answer that a police officer has interpretive authority and 
the answer that a police officer has enforcement discretion are both apt. In 
that case we would ask which understanding is widely accepted as the best 
understanding of the officer’s conduct. If there is such a widely accepted 
understanding, then that settles the matter.  
But the answer to the question which is the best understanding might 
not be clear. To the extent that we understand the behavior of highway 
police officers as making ticketing decisions ad hoc, dependent on 
judgments that are not perspicuous to drivers (about, say, momentary 
needs regarding resource allocation), that behavior is sensibly understood 
as the exercise of discretion. On the other hand, to the extent that we 
believe that ticketing decisions are determined by factors that are 
knowable by drivers (e.g., traffic conditions, weather conditions, 
construction work) and by generally known rules of thumb (e.g., that 
speeds within five miles per hour of the literal limit will not subject drivers 
to prosecution), that behavior is sensibly understood as interpreting the 
speed limit law to incorporate some leeway. 
Thus, it might be the case that there is no widely accepted best answer 
to how we should characterize the officer’s behavior and that it is, 
accordingly, a matter of controversy within the community whether the 
 
 
 51. These will typically include the need to pick and choose enforcement to husband limited 
administrative resources, the need to decline enforcement in a particular case when enforcement would 
cause injustice, and the need to decline enforcement in a particular case when enforcement would 
injure the public. 
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officer in my case was interpreting the law or exercising enforcement 
discretion. That is, there might be no clearly correct answer to the question 
although each of the two readings of the situation will be regarded as 
legitimate (because apt). 
And though unlikely, we might conclude that neither understanding is 
apt—that is, that the relevant social values do not support the conclusion 
that the officer has interpretive authority or enforcement discretion in this 
matter. In that case, we would conclude that the officer’s failure to ticket 
me was illegitimate, a dereliction of her duty, a disregard of the law.
52
 
However, we should not consider disregard to be a purely negative 
category: the conclusion that remains when readings of the officer’s 
actions as an exercise of interpretative authority or of enforcement 
discretion have been eliminated as inapt. On the contrary, it is important to 
see that disregard of the law is itself a values-based conclusion. For the 
officer can only sensibly be understood to disregard the law if we believe 
that police officers are obligated to follow the law. Put another way, if 
ours was a community that regarded the police as operating without 
meaningful legal constraints (the examples of the SA, SS, and Gestapo in 
Nazi Germany come to mind), then the failure of the police officer to 
ticket me could not correctly be interpreted as a disregard of the law. For 
that reason a correct interpretation of the officer’s conduct as a disregard 
of the law—like all correct interpretations—must be apt, i.e., anchored in 
one or more of the social values relevant to judging the conduct of police 
officers. 
 
 
 52. The recent IRS scandal regarding alleged increased scrutiny of applications for 501(c)(4) 
status from conservative groups offers an example. For a summary of the controversy see 2013 IRS 
controversy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_IRS_controversy (last visited July 16, 
2014). The public outrage generated by these allegations can be understood in large part as deriving 
from the fact that no relevant tax values seem to justify this kind of differential treatment on 
ideological grounds. 
 It cannot be stressed too often that the questions of what values constitute a field of law, what 
those values mean, and how those values apply to particular cases, are empirical questions. At the 
same time, we routinely make effective use of values without the systematic collection of data 
regarding social views. For example, properly constituted juries are thought to reflect the community’s 
views on the values relevant to particular litigation and thereby serve as an acceptable proxy for 
surveying the community as a whole. 
 In the example discussed in the text, the question of what reading of the officer’s conduct is 
widely regarded as best by the community is similarly an empirical question, and I do not purport to 
have the relevant empirical data at hand. However, we can probably safely eliminate the “disregard” 
reading for the reason that the general behavior of drivers suggests a widely held view that one can 
exceed the literal speed limit to some extent under normal conditions without fear of being ticketed. 
That is, driver behavior suggests that the community does not regard the failure to prosecute me for 
driving seventy in a sixty-five mile per hour stretch of highway as lawless.  
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Like the speed limit sign, the officer’s conduct has no intrinsic 
meaning. We choose a meaning among the available facts-fitting 
candidates, and the one we choose must be justifiable because it is widely 
regarded as best and because it is apt in that it reflects widely accepted 
values applicable to the conduct of police officers. 
B. Hard and Easy Cases 
The famous debate between H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin in the 
second half of the twentieth century centered in significant part on the 
distinction between hard and easy cases. Hart conceptualized law as a 
system of rules and depicted each rule as an enclosed figure surrounded by 
a penumbra. In the figure’s interior are the cases to which the rule applies; 
outside the figure are the cases that do not fall within the rule’s extension. 
The penumbra—the figure’s indistinct border—represents the set of hard 
cases: cases for which it can be argued both that the rule applies and that 
the rule does not apply. In hard cases, Hart argued, the judge must choose 
which argument to follow and which result to reach and can permissibly 
choose either way.
53
 
Dworkin argued instead that law consists of principles as well as rules 
and that in hard cases principles lend relative weight to the different 
arguments and, accordingly, to the different results that follow from those 
arguments.
54
 Consequently, the judge is not free to choose either result in a 
hard case; competence requires her to choose the result that follows from 
the weightiest argument as determined by the relevant principles.
55
 
By focusing on social values, we can identify a different way of 
thinking about the difference between hard and easy cases. As noted 
previously, a successful provision within a field of law must be apt—that 
is, it must promote one or more of the social values that define the field. 
Since the values expressed by an apt provision are multiple and 
heterogeneous, it is always possible that the provision will be subject to 
different apt interpretations (both correct and incorrect interpretations), 
which express different priorities and emphases among those values. We 
can thus define an easy case as one in which either of two conditions is 
satisfied: (1) there is a correct (i.e., apt and widely accepted as best) 
interpretation of the applicable provision that leads to a particular 
 
 
 53. HART, supra note 5, at 124–36. 
 54. See generally Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967); Ronald 
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975). 
 55. See id. at 1074–78. 
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outcome, or (2) all apt interpretations of the applicable provisions lead to 
the same outcome. Accordingly, we can define a controversial case as one 
in which there is no correct interpretation and different apt interpretations 
lead to different outcomes. Put differently, a controversial case is one in 
which the relevant social values generate opposing arguments because 
they point in different directions and the various apt interpretations 
justified by those values lead toward different outcomes. Moreover, since 
values indicate the relevant facts, the different arguments that are possible 
in a hard case will make the case controversial in terms of what facts are 
relevant to its resolution. 
What does it mean to say that values “point” toward one outcome or 
another? It cannot be observed too often that a social value does not have 
an intrinsic meaning. Insofar as it has meaning, that is a function of 
convergence on that meaning within a community, i.e., it is a sociological 
fact. If there is no widespread acceptance of the meaning of a value within 
the community, then the value has no meaning for purposes of law and 
cannot, therefore, point in any direction or toward any outcome in a 
particular case. Conversely, a value that does have a meaning widely 
accepted within the community (evidenced by the reality of repeatedly 
successful communication that invokes that value) can point to a particular 
outcome when invoked in the context of a particular case. 
Consider, for instance, the crime of attempt, as defined in the 
Pennsylvania Crimes Code: “A person commits an attempt when, with 
intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a 
substantial step toward the commission of that crime.”56 Application of 
this provision requires judgment about whether defendant’s conduct 
constitutes a “substantial step” toward the crime’s commission. Many 
cases are easy. If my plan to kill my sworn enemy progresses no further 
than my thinking through the details of the murder, I am not at that point 
guilty of attempted murder, even if my thoughts could be proven (as when, 
for example, I memorialize them in my diary). At the other end of the 
spectrum, if to carry out a plan to kill my sworn enemy, I legally purchase 
a firearm, walk to his house, ring the doorbell, and shoot him five times 
when he answers the door, odds are great that I will be convicted of 
attempted murder if he survives the attack. 
But some cases are hard. Suppose based on a tip, I am arrested while 
walking to my sworn enemy’s house. Have I committed attempted murder 
 
 
 56. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901(a) (1998). 
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at that point? In doctrinal terms, have I crossed the line that separates 
“mere preparation” from attempt?57 
Reference to social values offers a way of accounting for our sense that 
the first two cases are easy and the last one hard. In easy cases we expect 
to find either a correct interpretation of the “substantial step” provision 
that gives us the easy results or a set of values that all point to those 
results. In the examples above we find that actually both conditions are 
satisfied. 
With respect to the first case (formulating the plan to kill my sworn 
enemy), a true Abstract Proposition of criminal law is that we do not 
punish people for their thoughts. Moreover, as noted earlier, it is widely 
accepted within the community that various retributive and utilitarian 
values constitute the field of criminal law. If we ask retributive questions, 
the community will conclude that my plan does not amount to the kind of 
wrongdoing that justifies punishment. Moreover, the widely held belief 
that individuals are often tempted by bad thoughts but can be expected to 
resist them leads to the conclusion that my mere planning does not render 
me blameworthy as a criminal. In short, the community will not regard me 
as deserving punishment for privately planning a killing. Similarly, if we 
ask utilitarian questions, we get the same result. The idea of deterring 
people from thinking about the death of others would strike most as 
foolish. Moreover, as long as my “conduct” remains in the realm of 
thought, it is not at all clear that I need incapacitation or even 
rehabilitation. 
On the other hand, shooting a person with the intent to kill is 
paradigmatic of an attempted murder, and both retributive and utilitarian 
values, as widely understood, straightforwardly justify punishing me for 
shooting my sworn enemy five times. I have acted wrongly and am 
blameworthy (retributive concerns); moreover, this kind of conduct needs 
to be deterred, and I have shown myself to be a danger and consequently 
in need of incapacitation and rehabilitation (utilitarian concerns). 
With respect to the case in which I am apprehended while on my way 
to my sworn enemy’s house, the relevant retributive and utilitarian 
concerns do not point toward a single result. In retributive terms my 
intention is bad and I have engaged in multiple acts to carry out that 
intention. At the same time every one of my specific acts (planning the 
murder, buying the weapon, walking toward my sworn enemy’s house) 
has been lawful, and I still have time to change my mind and conform my 
 
 
 57. E.g., Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 417 A.2d 1203, 1205 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). 
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conduct to the requirements of the law. In utilitarian terms we surely want 
to deter attempts to murder and to prevent this particular murder, which 
has progressed through several planned steps, but we also want to 
encourage individuals to change their mind and pull back from 
wrongdoing—both because such exercises in law-abiding autonomy 
support good citizenship values and because it costs society less in terms 
of law enforcement when individuals police their own behavior. This 
failure of the relevant social values to point decisively to a particular result 
makes the case hard and, accordingly, controversial. 
C. Rules and Standards 
Armed with this way of understanding hard (controversial) and easy 
(uncontroversial) cases, we are now ready to address the rules-standard 
distinction. And I begin by returning to Hart’s useful invitation to imagine 
a provision of law as a figure enclosed by a penumbra, with the clear 
interior and exterior representing easy cases and the penumbra 
representing hard cases, requiring choice among competing and 
inconsistent apt interpretations. 
It follows from the discussion of openness in Part I that the thickness of 
the penumbra surrounding a provision will depend on its degree of 
openness. A provision that reflects a single value within the field or that 
privileges one value above the others will generate few if any 
controversial cases since there are either no competing social values to 
point toward different outcomes or other social values will do so only 
weakly (since they are subordinated to a single, primary value). 
Conversely, the more heterogeneous social values a provision reflects 
equally, the greater the chance that those values will point toward different 
outcomes in particular applications of the provision and the smaller the 
chance that those conflicting values will be resolved by a widely accepted 
correct interpretation—thus, generating a larger number of hard cases.  
The distinction between rules and standards can be understood in terms 
of degrees of openness. Standards are legal provision that have a high or 
moderate degree of openness; consequently, they will likely have 
relatively thick penumbras. A substantial number of cases will be 
controversial, caused by opposing apt arguments based on opposing apt 
interpretations of the provision. By contrast, rules are provisions that have 
a low degree of openness and, therefore, thin penumbras, in which few 
controversial cases can be found. And again, because values indicate what 
facts are relevant when applying a provision, a rule justified on the basis 
of a single or few values will require relatively few factual determinations 
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for its application; by contrast, a provision justified in terms of multiple, 
heterogeneous values will require something approaching the totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis characteristic of standards. 
For example, as noted earlier,
58
 the tort duty of ordinary care displays a 
high degree of openness. That is, an analysis to determine whether an 
individual’s conduct has breached the duty of ordinary care requires 
consideration of a variety of tort values. General experience suggests that 
our society values these sets of concerns in roughly equal measure. 
Moreover, the duty applies to an enormous range of everyday interactions 
among members of the community, and the potential in those interactions 
for conflict among the duty’s constitutive social values is great. The 
consequence of all this is individualized, totality-of-the-circumstances 
evaluations of disputes to determine what the duty of ordinary care 
amounts to in particular situations. In conventional terms, we treat the duty 
of ordinary care as a standard. 
By contrast, a statute of limitation displays a low degree of openness. 
To be sure, statutes of limitation promote multiple social values.
59
 One set 
of these is procedural in nature. Statutes of limitations promote efficiency 
and accuracy in civil litigation by barring claims that accrued long in the 
past. Efficiency is served by keeping the number of claims down, and 
accuracy is served by eliminating claims supported by stale evidence. Also 
within the procedural set is the need for sufficient time to evaluate the 
desirability of filing a lawsuit and to prepare properly to do so. Aside from 
procedural concerns, society values the ability to move on with one’s life, 
free of potential lawsuits constantly hanging over one’s head. Statutes of 
limitations promote this value, too. Of particular note is the potential 
conflict between the need for sufficient time to sue, which presses in the 
direction of allowing a longer limitation period, and the other values, 
which press in the direction of a shorter period. But in ordinary practice, 
efficiency occupies a privileged status among the relevant social values, 
and efficiency strongly supports focusing on a single fact as relevant to the 
application of a statute of limitation: the amount of time that has elapsed 
since the right of action accrued, rather than a totality-of-the-
circumstances examination of the facts surrounding each filed claim. 
Hence, statutes of limitations function as rules. 
 
 
 58. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 59. The values discussed in this paragraph, organized somewhat differently, are summarized in 
Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of Reparations 
Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 73–82 (2005). 
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This way of understanding rules and standards has four important 
ramifications. First, applications of an apt provision will always generate 
predominantly uncontroversial cases, regardless of its degree of openness. 
That is, both rules and standards generate mostly easy cases. The reasons 
for this go back to the points made in Part I about why the community’s 
discourse about fields of law will tend to converge on stable, shared 
understandings of the constitutive social values: (1) the practical point that 
convergence on interpretations of provisions of law that generate 
predominately easy cases is necessary to achieve the predictability 
required for the rule of law, and (2) the existential point that the integrity 
of a community depends on the stability of its laws and the consistency of 
their enforcement, a stability and consistency that require convergence on 
interpretations of provisions of law that generate predominately easy 
cases. Conversely, an inapt provision, like the Jacksonville vagrancy 
ordinance discussed in Part I, will be characterized by a vast penumbra 
and will generate predominately controversial cases. 
Second, I have argued throughout this Article that the identity of the 
social values that define a field and the meaning of those values (including 
what facts they make relevant in the application of provisions within the 
field) emerge as a shared understanding from the community’s collective 
and ongoing experience with applying provisions of law to important 
questions that arise within the field. Similarly, as noted at the end of Part I, 
the degree of openness that provisions reflecting those values display 
emerges from that same community engagement. If all that is correct, it 
challenges a cornerstone of the conventional understanding of rules and 
standards, which holds that the distinction between rules and standards 
turns on “whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post”60 and that 
whether a provision of law is a rule or standard is fixed by legislative 
decision at the time of its creation.
61
  
Consider the highway speed limit problem discussed in Part II.A.2. We 
can reasonably hypothesize that when lawmakers promulgated the first 
 
 
 60. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 
(1992). To invoke Kaplow’s version of the rule-standard chestnut used in this Article: A rule 
prohibiting speeds on the highway “in excess of 55 miles per hour” seems to tell us ex ante most of 
what we need to know about what the law requires; a traffic court judge adjudicating a speeding ticket 
would only have to determine where the alleged offense took place and how fast the alleged offender 
was driving. By contrast, a standard prohibiting driving at an “excessive speed” on the highway seems 
less predictable as it appears to leave much of the judgment to the post hoc assessment of, say, our 
traffic court judge. Id. 
 61. See id. at 559 (“This Article offers an economic analysis of the extent to which legal 
commands should be promulgated as rules or standards . . . .”). 
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highway speed limit, they regarded it as a rule: drivers may not drive 
faster than the literal posted limit and will be subject to punishment for 
any infraction. Speed limits promote a widely shared social valuing of 
safety on the roads. At the same time, widely shared libertarian values 
(identified earlier as one of the transcendent “law values”) press toward 
reduced government regulation of and interference with individual 
choices, preferring preservation of the autonomy of each driver to 
determine what speed is safe under the circumstances and the private 
resolution of any disputes that might arise from driving behavior. For 
many drivers the desire to make individual judgments about what 
constitutes safe driving under the specific conditions of the moment leads 
often to speeds in excess of what is literally specified on the highway sign. 
At the same time, highway police must decide whether to stop individuals 
who drive faster than the literal posted limit, and the police often choose 
not to do so. This may partly be because of resources limitations, e.g., the 
lack of an adequate number of officers to stop everyone (although a period 
of strict enforcement might sharply reduce the number of violators). It 
may also be partly that the inaccuracy of speed detection equipment would 
generate many disputes and much litigation over trivially excessive 
speeds. So far, these considerations support our understanding of the 
failure to prosecute those who drive, say, five miles per hour over the 
literal posted limit as an exercise of enforcement discretion.  
But another reason—perhaps the dominant reason—for not prosecuting 
may well be that the police treat speed limits primarily as tools for 
enforcing a general social value of safe driving on the roads. And as long 
as the “excessive” speed is not causing a manifestly unsafe situation, the 
highway police tend to let it go. Put another way, speed limits come to be 
treated over time, through their use by the community, as provisions 
having a moderate degree of openness. That understanding of speed limits 
having stabilized, both drivers and law enforcement officials understand 
that some matters have been resolved ex ante (e.g., speeds under the literal 
posted limit are presumptively legal), while others are resolved ex post 
(e.g., a variety of factors bearing on the value of public safety—traffic 
flow, day of the week, weather conditions, presence of road maintenance 
workers, and so forth—will be taken into consideration when judging 
speeds over the literal posted limit). Understood this way, the failure to 
prosecute those who drive five miles per hour over the literal posted limit 
appears as an exercise of interpretive authority, treating the speed limit 
more as a standard than as a pure rule. 
Third, the “law values” identified in Part I tend to push the degree of a 
provision’s openness in different directions. Concerns with 
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administrability and the rule of law tend to push our interpretation of 
provisions toward lower degrees of openness, i.e., toward the use of rules. 
That is because the less open a provision—the fewer social values it brings 
into play and the fewer factual determinations it requires for its 
applications—the more fully we can realize the important goals of 
efficiency, predictability, consistency, and constraining official power. But 
all that comes at a price. A provision’s low degree of openness is achieved 
by suppressing or subordinating some of the values that constitute the 
relevant field of law, and that means suppressing or subordinating some of 
the things we care about when we engage with important questions 
involving that provision. In short, we risk a sacrifice of justice—of getting 
the right answer—which is more likely accomplished when we take all 
relevant social values and the facts they illuminate into account. (This 
gives rules their characteristic over- and under-inclusiveness.) Thus, the 
“law value” of justice pushes provisions toward higher degrees of 
openness, i.e., toward the use of standards. But that, too, comes at a cost: 
potential inefficiency, unpredictability, inconsistency, and abusive 
exercises of official power.  
The remaining “law value” identified earlier—libertarian values—can 
push the degree of a provision’s openness in different directions. We 
might generally expect it to press toward a lower degree of openness—
toward interpreting provisions as rules—in order to restrict the scope of 
law and its consequent interference with individual autonomy. But as the 
example of speed limits discussed above illustrates, libertarian 
considerations can also push in the direction of more openness. This 
occurs when treating the provision as a standard increases the range of 
conduct that fits within what the law defines as permissible behavior, 
thereby increasing autonomy.  
Fourth, because openness is a matter of degree, the thickness of the 
penumbra and the consequent likelihood of controversial applications of a 
legal provision will vary by degree. That means that the conventional view 
of rules and standards as binary opposites is wrong. Indeed, we might well 
jettison as misleading the whole rhetorical strategy of characterizing 
provisions as rules or standards. Were we to do that, we might see more 
clearly that provisions exhibit many gradations of openness. Some are 
extremely closed provisions with very thin penumbras (e.g., statutes of 
limitation, the standard deduction in federal income tax law); some 
moderately open (e.g., highway speed limits); and some very open (e.g., 
the standard of ordinary care in tort law). Furthermore, we would see that 
no provision is a pure rule with zero degrees of openness (even the 
standard deduction can generate an occasional controversial case) and 
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none is a pure standard (even the standard of ordinary care generates 
occasional “rules,” e.g., negligence per se provisions62). 
D. The Rule of Law
63
 
A social value identified in Part I of this Article as one of an open-
ended set of transcendent “law values,” which are important in all fields of 
law, is the rule of law. And I suggested in Part II.C that the rule of law 
tends to push our interpretations of legal provisions in the direction of 
rules, rather than standards, since rules hold out the promise of realizing 
the rule-of-law values, which include equal protection, certainty, and 
placing identifiable constraints on the power of officials. At the same time 
I noted that these benefits come at a cost: injustice.  
We could leave things at that. We could conclude that there are 
competing social values that we must engage with in choosing whether to 
promote the rule of law. However, we may get a more nuanced—and more 
useful—perspective on the rule of law if we press further.  
And we can always press further. For if I am correct that the 
fundamental question for law is what we as a community care about, then 
the central technique of jurisprudential inquiry is to press that question 
through each layer of answer. That is, law is social values all the way 
down.  
If we ask why we care about the rule of law, we might start by pointing 
to predictability, consistency, and uniformity in the law. And if we press 
further and ask why we care about consistency, uniformity, and 
predictability, our answer might be that we care about equality of 
treatment, the ability to plan our lives, and placing identifiable constraints 
on the power of officials.
64
 These are, on one level, instrumental goals in 
that they serve further ends. On another level we can regard them as 
deontological: components of a community’s moral duty to respect and 
facilitate the autonomy of its members (consistent with libertarian values). 
Either way, these goals are promoted by determinacy in our interpretation 
of legal provisions—the kind of determinacy facilitated by rules, with their 
 
 
 62. An interesting example of this phenomenon is the treatment of choice-of-law in the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971), which seeks to develop concrete rules 
through the repeated, ad hoc application of multiple, heterogeneous choice-of-law values to particular 
factual situations. See generally Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL 
L. REV. 315 (1972). 
 63. This part summarizes and refines a more detailed argument set out in Richard K. Greenstein, 
Why the Rule of Law?, 66 LA. L. REV. 63 (2005). 
 64. See Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 14. 
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strict prioritization of values and limitations on permissible interpretations 
of legal provisions. 
But the determinacy promoted by rules is fragile. The preceding part 
argued that what distinguishes rules from standards is the thickness of the 
penumbra: rules generate proportionately fewer controversial cases than 
do standards. If we focus on the large universe of non-controversial cases 
generated by rules, we can identify two features that make the application 
of rules predictable in the way required by the rule of law: first, the 
consistent recourse to the social values that define the particular field of 
which a rule is a part; second, the prioritization of those values in the 
manner characteristic of rules. However, we can also see that the lack of 
controversy is contingent. It is contingent because, as I argued in Part I, 
the social values that define the field of which a particular rule is a part are 
contingent—both as to their identity and their meaning. Moreover, the 
prioritization characteristic of rules is similarly contingent. But if those 
social values and their relative priority are always subject to being 
reconsidered, then change—whether incremental or radical—is always a 
possibility. And this constant, ineradicable possibility of change is 
accompanied by the possibility that a case that was once non-controversial 
will become deeply contested. 
For the rule of law to work, then, change must be kept under control. 
The identity and meaning of law’s values—and, thus, of law itself—
cannot vary wildly from moment to moment, but must change, if at all, 
slowly and incrementally. This, in turn, requires that those charged with 
interpreting and applying the law (judges, police, administrators, etc.) be 
committed to aligning their interpretations and applications with decisions 
made in the past and with the identification, understanding, and 
prioritization of values on which the community has converged. 
What would generate such a commitment? The answer seems to be the 
practical and existential exigencies discussed in Part I. That is, on the one 
hand we need law to facilitate private transactions, to mediate private 
disputes, to regulate public behavior, and to structure and limit coercion by 
public officials. Law can do that if what it requires, forbids, and permits is 
knowable, which in turn requires that we converge on consistent 
interpretations and applications.
65
 On the other hand, I identified an 
expressive value associated with the rule of law. That is, just as an 
individual’s integrity depends on the consistency with which she expresses 
her values through action, so the integrity of a community depends on the 
 
 
 65.  This was the point of the discussion of traffic signs in Part I. 
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consistency with which it expresses its most important values through 
action, including through its laws and their enforcement—i.e., through the 
way in which it uses law to facilitate private transactions, mediate private 
disputes, regulate public behavior, and structure and limit coercion by 
public officials. And the possibility of such a consistency depends on 
stable, widely shared understandings of the social values that constitute 
fields of law. 
Thus, the rule of law can be understood in terms of the consistent and 
stable expression of the community’s shared values. This understanding is 
reflected in the community’s commitment to decisions—legislative, 
judicial, and administrative—made in the past. That is, the rule of law 
reflects a desire to render new decisions that are consistent with our past 
decisions, a desire that has generated the doctrines of stare decisis, res 
judicata, legislative supremacy, and law of the case, as well as the various 
canons of statutory interpretation that tie textual meaning to past intentions 
regarding legislative goals (purposivism), language choice (the plain 
meaning rule and other textualist doctrines), and shared understandings 
regarding meaning (reliance on legislative history). 
An interesting feature of this expressive function of the rule of law is 
that it does not require strict determinacy in the application of law to 
particular cases. When we talk about what an individual stands for, we do 
not generally cast that discussion in terms of rules. Rather, we often talk 
about a person’s “principles,” and our expectation that a person will act in 
a principled way is fully consistent with the individual’s taking a totality-
of-the-circumstances approach to decision-making. Similarly, when we 
speak of a person having “integrity,” we do not generally understand that 
to entail inflexibility. On the contrary, we expect—even celebrate—a 
person’s ability to evolve as she acquires new experiences and tests her 
principles in real world practice. 
Communities are much the same. Our expectation that a community 
will express what it stands for through its legal decisions is not the 
expectation of rule-bound inflexibility. Rather, we expect communities, 
like people, to reflect and reconsider and change. Accordingly, law can be 
predictable and consistent in the way that serves rule-of-law values, not 
because it employs a mechanical jurisprudence, but by virtue of its 
consistent expression of the community’s values even as it reflects and 
reconsiders and even changes those values in the light of ongoing 
experience. This can be manifested in the reconsideration of law’s rules. 
However, often the more efficient instrument of choice for this kind of 
integrity is the use of standards. 
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This understanding of the rule of law as promoting both consistency 
and principled change can be compared to another transcendent “law 
value”: justice. As noted above, justice pushes us toward increased 
openness in our interpretation of provisions of law—to take into account 
as many of the community’s values and the facts they illuminate. At the 
extreme, it pushes us to decide each case from scratch in order to “get it 
right” without the interference of past decisions. But justice also demands 
consistency: that we treat like cases alike and reach different results only 
when the cases are distinguishable in principle.
66
 
Thus, both the rule of law and justice permit departures from the past, 
but at the price of a required explanation. That is, when consistency with 
the past is not apparent or when we intentionally reject past decisions and 
strike out in a new direction, those who make, interpret, and apply the law 
are expected to explain themselves—to explain how the decision is either 
consistent with established community values or is a justifiable departure 
from those values.  
We can now see that the rule of law is itself contingent on two 
conditions being satisfied. One is that the community converges on social 
values that structure what human activities ought to be subject to 
governance and how they should be governed. Whether such convergence 
exists is a matter of social fact, and the history of failed states illustrates 
that communities can fail to converge in this way (which is to say that 
groups of people can fail to become communities) and that the rule of law 
can itself consequently fail. The second condition is that those who wield 
the community’s coercive power must be committed to aligning their use 
of that power with the community’s values. Whether such a commitment 
exists is also a matter of social fact, and the history of tyrannies illustrates 
that the rule of law can fail in this way, too. 
CONCLUSION 
I suggested in the Introduction that this Article should be read as a 
thought experiment, the hypothesis of which is that thinking about the 
relationship between social values and law in the way outlined in Part I 
will render more intelligible a variety of important jurisprudential puzzles. 
The four discussions in Part II are arguments that the experiment may be 
successful with respect to difficult questions about our understanding of 
legal interpretation, the distinction between hard and easy cases, the 
 
 
 66. This idea is central to Ronald Dworkin’s analysis of judicial decision making in hard cases. 
See Dworkin, supra note 54. 
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distinction between rules and standards, and the meaning of the rule of 
law.  
And if this thought experiment is successful, it will have a practical 
payoff. Understanding the relationship between social values and law will 
enable lawyers and judges to be more incisive and perspicuous in their 
analyses of legal issues. And it will enable legislators and other policy 
makers to explain more clearly the reasons for change in the law. 
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